PUBLICATIONS

'A puzzle of epistemic paternalism', (2023), Philosophical Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2146490 (open access)

UNDER REVIEW (Please email me for drafts if you're interested!)

A paper on the dangers of engaging with certain false assertions (R&R at Episteme)

A paper on hedging and bullshitting

A paper on conspiracy theories and the position to know

A paper on objecting and Sosan performance normativity

IN PROGRESS (Various stages but there may be drafts available)

A paper on the impermissibility of partisan deference

A paper on a two-condition account of epistemic paternalism

A paper on LLMs and hedging

A paper on LLMs and the paradox of learning from them

LARGER SCALE PROJECT (happy to discuss)

Developing a theory of epistemic legitimacy. Doxastic focus in epistemology cannot explain all (or most) of the problems of misinformation, conspiracy theories, and so on. The problem is not (always) one of belief, it is a problem of epistemic legitimacy. Ideas that are not serious contenders with the truth---that are not epistemically legitimate---are  legitimised in the epistemic environment.